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SECOND THOUGHTS ON RUSTv. SULLIVAN AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Preliminary comment on Rust v. Sullivan has expressed serious 
misgivings on its first amendment implications. The majority of 
comment has suggested that Rust is in error, even as the dissent 
suggested, as a violation offreedom of speech. It is less clear to me 
than it is to others that either the dissent or the critics are correct. 1 
I have modeled the following comparison to try to gain some dis-
tance from the problem. The effort is to propose a rival case (and 
have the reader judge the adequacy of the comparison to his or her 
own critical satisfaction). Here is the comparison I want to suggest. 
1. Suppose the Supreme Court has held that while a state law 
forbidding "child abuse" as ordinarily understood (to forbid vari-
eties of harsh treatment of one's child) is valid as against a parental 
claim of right to provide for the rearing and discipline of his or her 
own child as he or she thinks best, and the Court has also held that 
the fourteenth amendment does protect a parent's interest in respect 
to the care, discipline, control, and rearing of children to the extent 
that the mere spanking of one's own child in one's own home can-
not be criminalized by the state.2 
2. Suppose Congress funds "family counseling" centers as 
part of its concern with the terrible general problem of poor child 
care in America, and that these centers will operate in much the 
same fashion as Title X projects currently do. Let us call these Title 
XI projects. 
3. Suppose the question arises in Congress, in drafting the 
family counseling assistance act, whether there should be any limi-
tations on eligibility for federal funds, and it is quickly resolved that 
1. There were other issues also presented in Rust, of course. The O'Connor dissent 
seemed to me well reasoned (that the Court should not have deemed the restrictive regulation 
to be consistent with the act under the circumstances, notwithstanding Chevron), but here I 
am not seeking agreement or comment on that point. Rather, I want to eliminate that kind of 
issue to examine the more basic criticism that has been ventured of the case (i.e., that assum-
ing the regulation were exactly faithful to the act of Congress then the act as applied is invalid 
under Roe and under the first amendment, contrary to the position taken by Rehnquist for 
five members of the Court). 
2. I need not elaborate the foundation for that opinion here, but it would have strong 
grounding in a number of family privacy cases-from Meyer, Skinner, Yoder, Griswold, 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, etc.-that suggest a fundamental right to have children and 
direct their upbringing at home as a parent, consistent with reasonable limitations essential 
for their fair protection. 
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there should be-that not just any kind of "counselling" is worthy 
of federal tax support. While recognizing that parents may have a 
constitutional right (so to speak)J to spank their own children, and 
while recognizing that some child psychologists believe that there 
are circumstances in which spanking is the preferred course for a 
parent to pursue, Congress nevertheless concludes that the use of 
spanking is nothing taxpayers should be asked to support. 
The case that emerges, then, is essentially this: federal funds 
are available on application to help defray expenses in operating 
local family counseling centers willing and interested in providing 
counselling on affirmative means of child rearing, but exclusive of 
"aversive" conditioning as a means of child rearing~ounselling 
the use of spanking cannot be provided by a Title XI project. A 
grant applicant acknowledges that the counselling it believes to be 
suitable to provide those seeking its services must include counsel-
ling inclusive of spanking. In its view, moreover, and in the view of 
the child psychologists it uses in its facilities, failure to mention 
spanking as a parentally responsible action would be professionally 
irresponsible.4 Unable (or unwilling) to limit its counselling exclu-
sive of such advice, its application for becoming a Title XI project is 
returned as failing the eligibility limitations Congress has expressly 
provided. 
One may modify this case to bring it more nearly parallel to 
Rust v. Sullivan. One may do this by supposing that a Title XI 
project is not itself a "family counseling" agency as such; rather, it 
is an agency that will furnish a list of family counseling agencies, 
but, to be eligible for federal funds, insofar as Congress does not 
approve of spanking children, the list an agency receiving federal 
funds uses in its capacity as a Title XI projects may not include 
counseling agencies that recommend spanking as among the alter-
natives parents should consider as appropriate to do. (Actually, 
this is not a very subtle hypothetical. Rather, it has been selected 
3. Actually, not a "right" in the correct sense, but rather a "liberty" they may exercise 
within limits otherwise validly set by each state (pursuant to its anti-child-abuse laws). 
4. Of course, it also concedes that not everyone agrees that counselling spanking is 
either necessary or desirable-it concedes (as it must) that there is a range and difference of 
opinion among professionals as among lay persons as well. Still, it holds firmly to its view 
that such persons are seriously mistaken and not really competent psychologists; in its view, 
no competent psychologist would fail to urge spanking at least in some circumstances. On 
the other hand, it also acknowledges (as it must) that while the Supreme Court has upheld 
parental rights (including spanking), the Court has never suggested that a parent has some 
kind of constitutional "duty" to use spanking. 
5. Such lists the same agency may provide elsewhere, on the other hand, may of course 
include agencies that do encourage the use of child spanking (i.e., nothing in confining its 
activity as a Title XI project in any way requires that it alter or abandon any other service or 
activity it is cu"ently engaged in). 
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merely to gain distance and perspective on the basic issue. I choose 
"spanking" rather than "abortion" because not all who feel deeply 
about abortion may feel equally deeply about the right to spank-or 
the unconstitutionality of legislation limiting tax support money to 
agencies not making referrals to those who will counsel the desira-
bility of spanking.) 
To stimulate some interest in this comparison, I sent a few pre-
view copies to a few first amendment buffs for their own first reac-
tion. Geoffrey Stone sent back the following provocative response, 
which with his permission is republished here. Perhaps others will 
see alternative ways of sorting it out as well. What does one think is 
the key?6 
William W. VanAlstyne 1 
• • • • • 
Dear Bill: 
Thanks for sending me your mock problem concerning Rust 
v. Sullivan. It is, indeed, intriguing. Let me, however, pose a 
counter hypothetical. 
Suppose the government decides to provide legal assistance 
for poor but non-indigent criminal defendants. Suppose also that 
attorneys who are funded through this program must agree not 
to inform their clients of their right to exclude evidence under 
the fourth amendment. I suggest that this hypothetical also 
duplicates Rust, but that our intuitions in this hypothetical run 
in exactly the opposite direction from your hypothetical. 
I can think of two possible explanations. First, it may be 
that we "rank" the constitutional rights at issue in these situa-
tions as follows: 1. fourth amendment, 2. abortion, 3. spanking. 
Thus, we think it legitimate for the government to discourage 
spanking, illegitimate for the government to discourage enforce-
ment of the exclusionary rule, and we are apparently divided 
over whether it is legitimate for the government to discourage 
abortion (an issue, however, that has been resolved for us by the 
Supreme Court in Harris and Maher). The problem with this 
6. Is there a denial of equal protection to the ineligible applicant? (But no one is made 
ineligible because of who they are, rather, they are ineligible only to the extent that they 
would admittedly presume to spend the funds for which they make application in a manner 
no applicant would be permitted to do. And if that is so, wherein does the denial of equal 
protection of the Jaw, differentiating them from anyone else, inhere?) Is it, rather, that the 
restriction abridges the constitutional rights of parents (to spank their children)? (But no 
sanction is threatened by this law for any such activity, so wherein is the infringement of that 
right?) 
7. William & Thomas Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. 
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explanation, of course, is that it would seem to return us to the 
realm of "preferred freedoms." 
A second explanation, suggested to me by Elena Kagan, one 
of my younger colleagues, is that the difference lies in our intu-
itions about the extent to which the "counselor" in each of the 
three situations would effectively determine the individual's deci-
sions for him or her. In the spanking hypothetical we know that 
individuals are well aware of the option of spanking. The mere 
fact that it is not recommended by a family counselling advisor 
would not seriously interfere with the individual's opportunity to 
exercise the right. In the abortion context, people are well aware 
of the right to abortion, but they may place more weight on the 
advice they receive from a family planning advisor because the 
decisions involved are so much more difficult. Finally, in the de-
fense counsel hypothetical, it's clear that individual defendants 
will have little knowledge of their constitutional rights and will 
therefore make their decisions almost entirely on the advice they 
receive from their attorneys. Hence, our intuitions may be ex-
plained by the extent to which we think the government is effec-
tively "trumping" the individual's decisions about the exercise of 
these rights. 
In any event, that's the best I can do at the moment. 
Sincerely yours, 
Geoffrey R. Stone 
